This edited volume offers a compelling constitutional and comparative analysis of the European Union's system of government, focusing on the appointment of the President of the European Commission.

By treating this selection process as a form of government formation, the book explores how institutional dynamics, political actors, and evolving constitutional practices shape executive power in the EU. Central to the analysis is the Spitzenkandidaten procedure, which exemplifies how the EU's 'living constitution' develops not only through treaty law but also through political practice.

The volume brings together leading scholars to examine the constitutional relationships between the European Commission, European Parliament, and European Council, and how these interactions influence broader governance structures. It also draws on comparative insights from national constitutional systems to illuminate the EU's unique institutional framework, particularly regarding parliamentary involvement and the role of political parties in executive selection.

Rather than offering a traditional account of EU institutional law, the book integrates history, politics, and constitutional theory to assess the sources and limits of constitutional development in the EU. It asks how the Spitzenkandidaten process contributes to the entrenchment of EU government practices and evaluates its normative implications for democratic legitimacy.

This volume is essential reading for scholars of EU law, comparative constitutionalism, and European politics, offering fresh perspectives on how the EU is governed as a polity and how its system of government continues to evolve.