Arguing that colour predicates fail to refer to anything in the actual world, this book offers prescriptive colour fictionalism as a pragmatic way to preserve color discourse as a useful fiction.

What if the world isn't coloured the way you see it? We take it for granted that a strawberry is red, the sky is blue, and leaves are green. These experiences feel as real and immediate as the objects themselves. Drawing on research from vision science, Dimitria Electra Gatzia reveals a profound disconnect: our vivid colour experiences do not represent reality. By integrating philosophy and vision science, it makes the case for Colour Fictionalism – a novel account that reconciles scientific considerations favoring error theory with pragmatic considerations favoring the preservation of ordinary colour discourse.

By integrating philosophical considerations with current evidence from vision science, this work moves beyond the traditional objectivism/subjectivism debate in order to establish prescriptive colour fictionalism as a viable and compelling alternative. With a methodology that bridges philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and vision science, it translates complex empirical findings into a clear philosophical argument and demonstrates how fictionalism can resolve empirical puzzles about colour, with profound implications for rethinking the relationship between perception and reality.