Rethinking Normativity in the Law and Beyond
Description
What are reasons? What are duties? What are values? This book presents a fresh account of these concepts and the interplay between them.
It defends a modest notion of a reason. It opens space for a notion of a duty that is fundamental and irreducible to that of a reason. And it proposes that engagement with value can be assessed as good, and that good engagement often involves the development of correct beliefs and fitting emotions. The result brings to light the normative significance of cognitive and affective attitudes, and reshapes the relationship between practical and epistemic normativity.
In this redrawing of the normative map, Rethinking Normativity engages with wide ranging resources, including Razian theory, care ethics, and accounts of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.
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The publication contains no hazards
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Table of Contents
2. Good Engagement (1): Mental Attitudes and Evidential Barriers
3. Good Engagement (2): Manners of Entertaining Mental Attitudes
4. Duties
5. Human Value: An Evidential Duty to Engage Well
6. Between Practical and Epistemic Normativity: Reflections on Pragmatic and Moral Encroachment
7. Some Lessons from Care Ethics
8. An Application: Good Engagement, Modesty, and Leniency in Sentencing
Product details
| Published | 15 Apr 2027 |
|---|---|
| Format | Ebook (PDF) |
| Edition | 1st |
| Pages | 240 |
| ISBN | 9781509991624 |
| Imprint | Hart Publishing |
| Series | Studies in Penal Theory and Ethics |
| Publisher | Bloomsbury Publishing |
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