'During Britain's bloody struggle to stabilise Basra, there were many opportunities to use information operations to contest the battle of the narrative waged by extremist politicians and bloodthirsty militants. British forces consistently failed to achieve this… Britain's enemies were much more successful at getting their messages across. This clear and candid book, written by an expert practitioner, is an important wake-up call to those who study armed conflict and plan modern warfare.'

Ben Barry, International Institute for Strategic Studies, UK

'Chandler not only provides an incisive critique of Britain's approach to information operations during its campaign in Southern Iraq but also delivers a stark warning to policymakers about the consequences of employing the military to pursue objectives that it is neither resourced nor prepared to carry out. This thought provoking and diligent history retains contemporary relevance. A capability like information operations cannot be built overnight on shifting sands; as Chandler demonstrates, it must be developed in advance from firm foundations.'

Jack Watling, Royal United Services Institute, UK