This exceptionally well-integrated collection of essays about the October 1973 War (also referred to as the Yom Kippur or Ramadan War) and its consequences offers an excellent overview of Arab-Israeli politics prior to October 7, 2023, 50 years later. William B. Quandt, who served on Henry Kissinger’s National Security Council staff in 1973, argues in the introduction that the war could have been avoided had Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir been less intransigent and if Kissinger had taken Egyptian President Anwar Sadat more seriously in earlier discussions of a major diplomatic initiative. As it was, the conduct of the war led to the breakdown of détente with the Soviet Union and a nuclear alert because Kissinger had given the Israelis too much slack in obeying the ceasefire negotiated by the superpowers. Several contributing authors question Kissinger’s credibility, and Quandt still wonders what really lay behind Sadat’s refusal of an earlier ceasefire proposal, given his distrust of the Syrian ally and his control of Egypt’s professionalized military. An earlier ending might have preempted any use of the Arab oil weapon. The ensuing peace process unfortunately excluded the Palestinians, also extensively analyzed in the present volume. A must-read! Essential. General readers through faculty; professionals.

Choice Reviews

Despite being a pivotal event, the 1973 war has received far less academic attention than its predecessors, the 1948 and 1967 wars. This volume strongly contributes to making amends through thoroughly addressing some of the core questions surrounding the war.

Jørgen Jensehaugen, Peace Research Institute Oslo

Jackson’s edited volume provides a seminal view of the flawed perceptions that led to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, reexamining superpower détente, the nuclear dimension and the U.S. role in shaping the outcome of that clash. Based extensively on archival material, these six chapters offer new insights into Israeli decision making, the recasting of the Egyptian army, the scope of Syria’s strategic goals and the impact of the war upon the Palestinians.

Zach Levey, University of Haifa

Galen Jackson’s edited volume features powerful and illuminating contributions to our understanding of the logics that drove the Arab states to act, that led the Golda Meir government to prefer war to the political risks of peace, and that blocked promising diplomatic opportunities for the United States and the Soviet Union to achieve the Arab-Israeli peace that has proven so elusive ever since.

Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, Ian Lustick, University of Pennsylvania